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Tsunami disaster 2004 : Lessons from resettlement
Dharmasiri De Alwis, Sri Lanka
Impact of tsunami disaster
The tsunami waves, which devastated over two thirds of the 
coastal belt of twelve districts in the North, East, South and 
the West of the island affected about one million people and 
claimed 35, 322 human lives, injured 21441 and left 1500 
children without parents. Social networks were disrupted, 
assets were destroyed and infrastructure facilities such as 
water and electricity were severely affected. 
There was massive assistance from the local and inter-
national civil society, who provided shelter, mobilized to 
clear roads. 
The government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) had mutually agreed, how to proceed with rescue 
and relief operations in the North and East. 
Damage and international response
The total cost of relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation 
had been estimated at US$ 2.2 billion. The government had 
projected that it would take 3-5 years to rebuild destroyed 
structures and restore full recovery. The largest financing 
needs were identified as shown below:
East – 45%, South – 25.9%, North – 19% West-10.1%
Institutional mechanisms
Subsequent to the Tsunami disaster, positive collective ac-
tions were taken on a scale never before. Recognising the 
seriousness of the loss, coupled with lack of experience, 
the government created an institutional mechanism to co-
ordinate assistance. The President immediately set up three 
task forces:
(i) Task force for Rescue and Relief (TAFRER)
(ii) Task Force for Law and Order and Logistics (TA-
FLOL)
(iii) Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN)
At the national level, the Centre for National Operations 
(CNO) was established under the chairmanship of the 
President to co-ordinate relief operations and to collect and 
disseminate information.
In the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the uncleared 
areas the government and the LTTE cooperated with each 
other well. Meanwhile, the government appointed a Parlia-
ment Select Committee on natural disaster, which made 
significant progress to pass a Disaster Management Act.
To manage the rebuilding exercise, in September 2005 
TAFREN itself recognized that it should focus on four 
areas namely:
(i) Getting victims back into homes
(ii) Restoring livelihoods
(iii) Health, Education and Protection for all
(iv) Upgrade National Infrastructure.
Organization and co-ordination
In the latter part of 2005 the Cabinet of Ministers approved 
the establishment of an authority combining all organizations 
under various ministries that carry out relief, rehabilita-
tion and reconstruction caused by man-made or natural 
disasters.
By May 2005, the signing of the “Post-Tsunami Operational 
Management Structure” (P-TOMS) agreement tookplace. 
However, the constitutionality of the agreement was chal-
lenged in the Supreme Court, and it kept certain provisions 
on hold pending clarification.
The state agencies promptly attended to the infrastructure 
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retains within the first two weeks. Damaged bridges and roads 
were repaired with the assistance of various partners and 
telephone lines and electricity supply were restored within 
a short period. Similarly the railway transport system was 
put in operation within the first month.
Transitional shelter – Policy and 
achievements
The displaced families initially found shelter in emergency, 
accommodations such as tents, public buildings and religious 
places or sought refuge with friends and relatives. Therefore 
transitional shelters were required to bridge the gap between 
emergency accommodation and permanent housing.
A transitional shelter must not only provide protection from 
the environment but should provide secure habitable living 
space and a platform for re-establishing livelihoods.
Due to the efforts of the government and its development 
partners, 54, 102 shelters were completed by November 
2005. Treated water was supplied to camps and temporary 
settlements using 80 water bowsers and pipelines. Over 5000 
toilets have been constructed along with bathing facilities.
Buffer zone or setback zone
Consequent to the disaster, the government made a quick 
decision to introduce a buffer zone 100 metres wide in the 
south and southwest. And 200 metre wide in the north and 
east, as the damage to life and property was greater there 
than in the south. 
The introduction of buffer zone has however created two 
types of housing programmes, as a policy. One programme 
is to build new houses by the donors, while the other is by 
the owners themselves.
(i) Donor-built housing reconstruction programme
All affected families are entitled to a house built by a 
donor in accordance with government policy. The donor 
has to provide each new settlement with internal common 
infrastructure while the government is obliged to provide 
the services such as, drinking water supply, electricity and 
access roads up to the relocation site. 
Table 01 shows the total number of housing units to be 
built under the Donor-built programme. The number of 
houses required has been obtained from three sources and 
it is very clear that they do not tally with each other. Due 
to this difficulty, information in the first column has been 
taken as authentic.
(ii) Home-owner driven housing reconstruction 
programme
This programme involves reconstruction of partly or fully 
damaged houses which were situated outside the buffer zone. 
The government provides a cash grant reimbursed by differ-
ent development banks and bilateral donors, to an affected 
homeowner for the reconstruction of his/her house. 
This programme is funded by a consortium of four do-
nors. Under this programme, a house is either classified as 
a partially damaged (32, 497) or a fully damaged (23028). 
Table 02 shows an estimated additional 11,000 houses under 
the same programme.
The Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) was 
thus created on 30 March 2005 with the approval of the 
Cabinet of Ministers and it was placed under the Ministry 
of Urban Development and Water Supply. Similarly, an 
Institutional Arrangement for the Home Owner-Driven 
programme was realized and the following organizations 
were thus created.
(a) SouthWest Housing Reconstruction Unit (SWHRU) 
to function under the TAFREN
(b) North East Housing Reconstruction Unit (NEHRU) 
to operate under the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation 
and Reconciliation.
Restoring livelihoods 
It has been estimated that about 150,000 people lost their main 
source of income. Nearly 50% of them were in the fisheries 
sector and the rest were in agriculture, tourism, public sector, 
small and micro enterprises and other sectors.
TAFREN is tasked with the overall co-ordination of all 
livelihood programmes in collaboration with the line min-
istries. About eight ministries and 100 international and 
national organizations are involved in livelihood restoration 
activities.
Upgrading national infrastructure
The government recognized that thorough and permanent 
infrastructure rebuilding measures form a vital part of the 
Tsunami recovery process. Therefore, immediate tasks have 
been put in hand quickly to restore services
(i) Roads
Over 1000 km of national roads, together with 1500 km of 
provincial roads and unclassified roads of local authorities 
are targeted for reconstruction and rehabilitation. The cost is 
estimated at US $ 317 million for national roads and US$39 
million for provincial and other roads.
(ii) Railways
The total cost of damage to rolling stock is estimated at Rs. 
175 million, Rs. 360 million for tracks and bridges, Rs, 900 
million for signal and communication network and Rs. 50 
million for staff quarters.
(iii) Electricity
Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) has assigned itself the goal 
of restoring electricity supply to all Tsunami affected areas. 
This is being done under the “Sri Lanka Tsunami Affected 
Areas Recovery and Take-off (STAART). Project to provide 
electricity to 23000 homes in year 2005.
(iv) Water supply and sanitation
In this sector, the overall goal is provision of sufficient and 
sustainable water supply and sanitation services to the Tsu-
nami affected areas. The targets have been spread over three 
phases namely, emergency, restoration and expansion.
The overall cost of rebuilding water supply and sanitation 
facilities has been US$201 million. Of this approximately 
US$36 million is for direct Tsunami damage. Current donor 
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commitments amount to Rs. 16.5 billions, leaving Rs. 6.8 
billion unfunded.
Ground wells have been cleaned, but the quality of water 
was such they were unfit for human consumption, being pol-
luted. Therefore, the state has been forced to implement new 
large water supply projects to cater to the existing and new 
settlements. The capacity of the state implementing agencies 
has therefore been stretched with the new projects underway 
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causing a significant capacity building programme.
Furthermore, effective coordination mechanism to facilitate 
the partners in housing, water supply electricity and roads at 
all levels of the government has still not been created. This 
is crucial to ensure that the new settlements are provided 
with basic infrastructure facilities.
In the water sector, several particular problems were identi-
fied including sustainable maintenance of water and gully 
bowsers and packaged water treatment plants, commence-
ment of sanitation studies and development of sewerage for 
new settlements.
The government had already passed environmental legisla-
tion and entrusted the institutions with the responsibility of 
ensuring that environmental concerns are incorporated into 
development projects. However implementing this legisla-
tion is complicated by the significant population utilizing 
coastal resources on a daily basis.
Findings and conclusions
With the reconstruction programme now entering its second 
year, it is possible to learn from the past years experience 
and develop an agenda of actions that must be taken quickly 
by all partners to move the process forward.
(i) It is the view of both internal and external observers 
that Sri Lanka has made considerable progress in the 
reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure. The 
event yielded immense international goodwill, external 
assistance and even revival of the peace process.
(ii) The primary guiding principle of the programme is that 
of equity. Funding pledges were however adequate. 
Therefore, it is vital that all pledges are converted 
into commitments and all commitments into disburse-
ments. 
(iii) During the implementation of the programme, it was 
realized that a very powerful organization should have 
been created, to direct the operations at all levels instead 
of “Task Forces”.
(iv) The programme of reconstruction is mainly housing, 
infrastructure, landscape, storm-water drainage system 
etc. and therefore the District Organisation should have 
been headed by an experienced Technical Person such 
as a Civil Engineer. 
(v) There have been several instances where lands unsuit-
able for human settlement and building purposes were 
identified. Reclamation of such lands has been costly 
and time consuming.
(vi) The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed 
between the government and the Donor is a weak 
document. 
(vii) Every affected family should know, their future, in 
terms of housing, employment, relief support, educa-
tion for their children and with health care.
(viii) A serious shortcoming in the monitoring process has 
been the furnishing of unreliable data and informa-
tion to the Data Bank and Management Information 
System.
(ix) According to the MOU signed the basic infrastructure 
such as water, electricity and internal roads has to be 
provided by the donor, if the housing component in the 
settlement has been undertaken by a single donor. 
(x) Different donors have adopted layouts of their choice 
in constructing the houses. However, these different 
layouts have resulted different positions for toilets and 
kitchens.
(xi) A very serious lapse on the part of the planning has 
been the search for water sources, after construct-
ing the houses. Disposal of garbage too has caused 
inconvenience to the beneficiaries, as it has not been 
considered during planning. 
(xii) A gender issue that is faced by the tsunami affected 
areas has been the benefits such as cash grants which 
have gone to the chief occupant of the household, 
generally a male. 
(xiii) Regarding transitional shelters, they need be maintained 
and upgraded until permanent housing is complete. 
(xiv) Constraints on construction capacity and cost of 
infrastructure supplies are rising much faster than 
anticipated. 
(xv) The damage caused to the environment includes sali-
nization of paddy fields, agricultural lands and ground 
wells.
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